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 II.-266 
TO FEE OR NOT TO FEE: THE 
AVAILABILITY OF ATTORNEY’S FEES IN 
DECLARATORY RELIEF ACTIONS FOR 
COPYRIGHT ABANDONMENT UNDER THE 
COPYRIGHT ACT 
Abstract: On May 13, 2020, in Doc’s Dream, LLC v. Dolores Press, Inc., the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that a court has discretion under 
§ 505 of the Copyright Act to award reasonable attorney’s fees in declaratory re-
lief actions for copyright abandonment. In this matter of first impression, the 
Ninth Circuit reversed the U.S. District Court for the Central District of Califor-
nia’s holding that a declaratory relief action for copyright abandonment does not 
invoke the fee-shifting provision under the Copyright Act. This Comment argues 
that the Ninth Circuit’s holding appropriately reflects congressional intent. 
INTRODUCTION 
Congress established federal copyright protections under the Copyright 
Act of 1976 (the Act) to advance two constitutional goals: to promote creative 
progress and broaden public access to art and science.1 Section 505 of the Act, 
among other sections, reflects these constitutional objectives.2 Section 505 of 
                                                                                                                           
 1 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (stating that the purpose of the Patents and Copyrights Clause is 
“to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and 
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries”); 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–1401 
(providing the Copyright Act in its entirety); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 
U.S. 417, 429, 431–32 (1984) (citing United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131 (1948)) (ex-
plaining that copyright law’s main purpose is to motivate creators to continue to create by providing 
temporary ownership in their creations while limiting their ownership so the public eventually has 
access to such works). Congress, empowered by the Constitution’s Patents and Copyrights Clause, 
established federal copyright protections. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. Despite this grant, the Consti-
tution does not give citizens natural copyright or patent rights, and Congress has no obligation to im-
pose copyright protections. See Darden v. Peters, 488 F.3d 277, 284 (4th Cir. 2007) (explaining that 
Congress is not required to create copyright protections). The only copyright protections granted to 
the public, therefore, are statutory. 18 AM. JUR. 2D Copyright and Literary Property § 1 (2021). In 
general, copyright is the exclusive protection of original creations that are put in a tangible form. Cop-
yright in General, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., https://www.copyright.gov/help/faq/faq-general.html [https://
perma.cc/A3ET-TM3R]. Copyright does not need to be registered, and, as a result, it exists the mo-
ment someone creates a piece of original work. Id. 
 2 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–1401. Through the Copyright Act, Congress 
recognized the importance of providing artists limited ownership of their works but emphasized that 
the main objective is to promote public use of those works. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–1401 (providing the 
Copyright Act’s various chapters, including the limits it imposes on creators’ exclusive rights to their 
works, such as for fair use); Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1979, 1986 (2016) (ex-
2021] Attorney’s Fees in Declaratory Relief Actions for Copyright Abandonment II.-267 
the Copyright Act, which grants courts discretionary fee-shifting privileges in 
civil actions under the Act, reflects these aims in two ways.3 First, the provi-
sion promotes creative progress by encouraging copyright holders with valid 
infringement claims to litigate them, thereby deterring infringement in the first 
place.4 Second, § 505 motivates the public to use and build upon art and sci-
ence by protecting parties against frivolous infringement claims and discourag-
ing parties with weak infringement claims from litigating.5 
                                                                                                                           
plaining that the overall purpose of copyright law is to promote the public use of art and science and 
that the Copyright Act bolsters this purpose by supporting both creators and public access to crea-
tions); Fogerty v. Fantasy Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 526 (1994) (explaining that the main purpose of the 
Copyright Act is to advance the public’s interest in art and science and award the production of art and 
science by providing limited ownership to creators); Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co. 499 
U.S. 340, 349–50 (1991) (holding that the overarching goal of the Copyright Act is to promote the 
progression of arts and sciences and that rewarding copyright holders is secondary to this mission). 
 3 See 17 U.S.C. § 505 (providing that courts have discretion under the Copyright Act to award 
reasonable attorney’s fees to the prevailing party in any civil action under the Act). Generally, fee-
shifting statutes enable courts to award or punish one party by making the losing party in litigation 
cover all or part of the prevailing party’s litigation costs. Fee-Shifting, AM. BAR ASS’N, https://www.
americanbar.org/groups/delivery_legal_services/reinventing_the_practice_of_law/topics/fee_shifting/ 
[https://perma.cc/N3PM-SPL2]. Attorney’s fees are payments made from a client to a lawyer for that 
lawyer’s services. Attorney’s Fee, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). Several fairness fac-
tors help courts determine the reasonableness of attorney’s fees, such as the time an attorney spends 
on the client, the attorney’s abilities and experience, and the challenges a particular case may impose. 
Id.; see MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.5 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020) (discussing when attorney’s 
fees are deemed excessive or unreasonable). 
 4 See 17 U.S.C. § 505 (granting courts fee-shifting powers under the Copyright Act and thereby 
adding another monetary reward or punishment parties can weigh when evaluating the risks of pursu-
ing litigation); Fogerty, 510 U.S. at 527 (explaining that § 505 of the Copyright Act purposefully 
encourages litigation following copyright infringement). The Copyright Act’s fee-shifting provision 
encourages copyright holders with meritorious claims to litigate them by eliminating some of the fears 
of expensive litigation. See Ben Depoorter, Copyright Enforcement in the Digital Age: When Remedy 
Is the Wrong, 66 UCLA L. REV. 400, 403 (2019) (examining the argument that statutory damages, 
like fee-shifting statutes, are necessary to ensure valid claims are brought to court when a party may 
not otherwise be able to afford the costs). Copyright infringement “occurs when a copyrighted work is 
reproduced, distributed, performed, publicly displayed, or made into a derivative work” absent the 
copyright owner’s permission. Definitions, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., https://www.copyright.gov/help/
faq/faq-definitions.html [https://perma.cc/WTG4-HK4M]. Copyright infringement claims are com-
prised of two elements: (1) copyright ownership and (2) a third-party’s copying of substantial pieces 
of the copyrighted works. Feist Publ’ns, Inc., 499 U.S. at 361 (citation omitted). There are several 
defenses to copyright infringement claims, including fair use. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (providing the fair 
use provision of the Copyright Act); Clark D. Asay et al., Is Transformative Use Eating the World?, 
61 B.C. L. REV. 905, 907 (2020) (arguing that fair use is the most important defense to copyright 
infringement claims). Defendants may claim fair use if they used the copyrighted piece in question for 
purposes such as news reporting, classroom use, teaching, or scholarship. 17 U.S.C. § 107. 
 5 See 17 U.S.C. § 505 (providing the Copyright Act’s fee-shifting provision); Kirtsaeng, 136 S. Ct. 
at 1986 (explaining that the fee-shifting provision in the Copyright Act discourages parties with weak 
claims from litigating but also encourages parties, both copyright holders and the public, to defend 
themselves against frivolous copyright claims because of the added protection of recovering attorney’s 
fees). 
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Although there is consensus that § 505 advances these constitutional 
goals, the boundaries of § 505 has been the subject of recent litigation.6 The 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in particular recently expanded 
what can constitute a civil action under the Act, thereby broadening a court’s 
fee-shifting ability.7 In 2020, in Doc’s Dream, LLC v. Dolores Press, Inc., the 
Ninth Circuit held, as a matter of first impression, that an action seeking a dec-
laration that a party has abandoned its copyright constitutes a civil action under 
the Act.8 In doing so, the court acknowledged its discretionary power to award 
reasonable attorney’s fees in these actions.9 
Part I of this Comment provides an overview of the Copyright Act’s fee-
shifting provision and the relevant facts and procedural background of Doc’s 
Dream, LLC.10 Part II discusses the divide between the U.S. District Court for 
the Central District of California and the Ninth Circuit regarding the scope of 
§ 505 of the Copyright Act.11 Finally, Part III argues that the Ninth Circuit’s 
holding in Doc’s Dream, LLC better reflects the congressional intent behind 
the Copyright Act.12 
                                                                                                                           
 6 See 17 U.S.C. § 505 (providing the fee-shifting provision of the Copyright Act); Fogerty, 510 
U.S at 517–18, 526 (explaining how § 505 aims to further the Copyright Act’s goals of increasing 
public access to creative works, which ultimately supports the overall constitutional goals of encour-
aging public access to the arts and sciences); see, e.g., Rimini St., Inc. v. Oracle USA, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 
873, 878 (2019) (holding that “full costs” in § 505 do not include expenses for jury consultants, e-
discovery, or witness fees, among other things); Kirtsaeng, 136 S. Ct. at 1985 (holding that objective 
reasonableness cannot be the controlling factor in determining whether to grant attorney’s fees under 
§ 505); Doc’s Dream, LLC v. Dolores Press, Inc., 959 F.3d 357 (9th Cir. 2020) (considering whether 
copyright abandonment constitutes a civil action under § 505 of the Copyright Act). 
 7 Doc’s Dream, LLC, 959 F.3d at 363. 
 8 Id.; see 17 U.S.C. § 505 (permitting courts to grant attorney’s fees if the action arises under the 
Copyright Act). A copyright owner can abandon their ownership of a copyright, meaning that any 
rights the copyright owner had under the Copyright Act no longer exist. See Micro Star v. Formgen, 
Inc., 154 F.3d 1107, 1114 (9th Cir. 1998) (explaining that copyright abandonment is a “well settled” 
right); Nat’l Comics Publ’g, Inc. v. Fawcett Publ’g, Inc., 191 F.2d 594, 598 (2d Cir. 1951) (pioneering 
the idea of “copyright abandonment”). In other words, once a copyright owner decides to abandon 
their copyright, they permanently forfeit their right to private ownership. See Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, 
The Right to Abandon, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 355, 391 (2010) (explaining that abandoned copyrights are 
permanently public). If a court declares that a copyright owner has abandoned their copyright, other 
parties cannot be held liable for copyright infringement. See Nat’l Comics Publ’g, Inc., 191 F.2d at 
598 (providing the copyright abandonment doctrine); Doc’s Dream, LLC, 959 F.3d at 358 (explaining 
that if a copyright holder abandons the copyright, the copyright protections are forfeited). 
 9 See 17 U.S.C. § 505 (stating that a court “may” grant attorney’s fees, therefore giving the court 
discretion in allocating such fees); Doc’s Dream, LLC, 959 F.3d at 363 (recognizing the court’s right 
to grant attorney’s fees in declaratory relief actions for copyright abandonment). 
 10 See infra notes 13–36 and accompanying text. 
 11 See infra notes 37–57 and accompanying text. 
 12 See infra notes 58–71 and accompanying text. 
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I. ATTORNEY’S FEES AND DOC’S DREAM 
In 2020, in Doc’s Dream, LLC v. Dolores Press, Inc., the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that declaratory relief actions for copyright 
abandonment sufficiently invoke the Copyright Act, thereby enabling courts to 
grant attorney’s fees under § 505.13 Section A of this Part discusses the Copy-
right Act’s attorney’s fees provision and a court’s power to award these fees.14 
Section B introduces the facts and procedural history of Doc’s Dream, LLC.15 
A. Section 505, Attorney’s Fees, and the “American Rule” 
An award of reasonable attorney’s fees is the exception, not the rule, in 
American law.16 Explicit statutory provisions that enable courts to grant attor-
ney’s fees are therefore exceedingly rare.17 Without concrete permission from 
                                                                                                                           
 13 See Doc’s Dream, LLC v. Dolores Press, Inc., 959 F.3d 357 (9th Cir. 2020) (providing the 
Ninth Circuit’s ruling regarding declaratory relief actions for copyright abandonment and the court’s 
right to grant attorney’s fees in such actions). 
 14 See infra notes 16–22 and accompanying text. 
 15 See infra notes 23–36 and accompanying text. 
 16 See Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 560 U.S. 242, 252–53 (2010) (explaining that the 
American Rule provides that each party pays its own attorney’s fees unless there is a statute or con-
tract that states differently); Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 
(1975) (explaining that American law, unlike English common law, does not ordinarily enable pre-
vailing parties to collect attorney’s fees without congressional support), superseded, in part, by stat-
ute, Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Award Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-559, 90 Stat. 2641 (1976) (codi-
fied at 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b)). The American Rule departs from the English Rule in part because of the 
complexities and uncertainties litigation brings. Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 
386 U.S. 714, 717–18 (1967), superseded, in part, by statute, Lanham Act, Pub. L. 79-489, 60 Stat. 
427 (1946) (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.) Under this reasoning, courts have held that 
parties should not be deterred from litigating or defending a claim because of an unjust fear of paying 
attorney’s fees when the outcome of litigation is often unclear. Id. at 718. Therefore, the general pur-
pose of attorney’s fees provisions, such as deterring frivolous claims and encouraging meritorious 
claims, are not advanced. Id. Additionally, the American Rule helps ensure that parties with less re-
sources are not further deterred from already costly litigation. Id. Ironically, this same argument is 
made in favor of fee-shifting statutes. See Note, Fee Simple: A Proposal to Adopt a Two-Way Fee 
Shift for Low-Income Litigants, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1231, 1238 (1988) (arguing that many fee-shifting 
statutes aim to lighten the burden on lower income parties, especially in cases where a party cannot 
afford representation or where a defendant has substantially more resources). Finally, additional litiga-
tion to decide how much attorney’s fees is reasonable provides more stress on the courts and may not 
justify the costs. Id. 
 17 See Pennsylvania v. Del. Valley Citizens’ Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546, 562 (1986) 
(stating that there are just over one hundred U.S. statutes that grant courts discretion to award reason-
able attorney’s fees); Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 457 n.2 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring) 
(explaining that statutory fee-shifting provisions are selective and do not represent litigation norms in 
America), superseded, in part, by statute, Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-34, 
110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1997(e)). 
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statutes, or other outliers to this American Rule, courts have deemed it outside 
their judicial powers to allocate these fees.18 
The Copyright Act is one such statute that employs a court’s fee-shifting 
privileges by granting courts discretionary power to award reasonable attor-
ney’s fees to a prevailing party in a civil action invoking the Act.19 The Su-
preme Court offered several factors, such as bad faith, frivolousness, and un-
reasonableness, that courts should consider when deciding whether to grant 
attorney’s fees in civil actions under the Copyright Act.20 The challenge here, 
                                                                                                                           
 18 See Christiansburg Garment Co. v. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n, 434 U.S. 412, 417 
(1978) (explaining that courts generally must rely on statutes and legislative guidance to impose attor-
ney’s fees but that there are “exceptional circumstances” where statutes are not necessary, such as 
when a party acts in bad faith); Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co., 421 U.S. at 247 (stating that it would be 
“inappropriate” for a court to award attorney’s fees without congressional consent but noting that 
there are exceptions to this general rule). There are two main outliers—the bad faith doctrine and the 
common-benefit doctrine—that empower courts to grant attorney’s fees despite no statutory grant to do 
so. See HENRY COHEN, CONG. RSCH. SERV., 94-970, AWARDS OF ATTORNEY’S FEES BY FEDERAL 
COURT AND FEDERAL AGENCIES 1 (2009) (explaining that these two doctrines stem from a federal 
court’s inherent powers). The bad faith doctrine allows courts to grant attorney’s fees to punish a party 
for acting in bad faith. Chambers v. Nasco, 501 U.S. 32, 50 (1991). For a court to award attorney’s 
fees based on the bad faith doctrine, the “movant must be the prevailing party,” the claim “provoking 
the motion must be unfounded,” and “the claim or defense must have been lodged with a bad motive, 
such as harassment.” Comment, Nemeroff v. Abelson, Bad Faith, and Awards of Attorneys’ Fees, 128 
U. PA. L. REV. 468, 472–73 (1979). The common-benefit doctrine, on the other hand, allows a court to 
impose attorney’s fees on “a class of individuals not participating in the litigation” but who substan-
tially benefit from that litigation. 32 AM. JUR. 2D Federal Courts § 191 (2021). Specifically, the doc-
trine allows the individual who brought the suit to recoup the litigation costs by taking the attorney’s 
fees out of the total benefit derived and splitting the remaining benefit among the class. Mills v. Elec. 
Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 392–94 (1970). The rationale behind this doctrine is to prevent the un-
just enrichment that would occur when an individual successfully sued on behalf of a class of people 
and the benefit was divided among that class. See id. (providing the justification for the common-fund 
and substantial benefit doctrine). 
 19 See 17 U.S.C. § 505 (granting statutory permission to award attorney’s fees in acts invoking the 
Copyright Act); Fantasy, Inc. v. Fogerty, 94 F.3d 553, 560 (9th Cir. 1996) (explaining that a court has 
the discretion to award attorney’s fees under the Copyright Act and that determining the reasonable-
ness of a fee must be made on a case-by-case basis). A prevailing party, for attorney’s fees purposes, 
is a party that wins, at least in part, what that party sought in the litigation. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433 
(quoting Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275, 278–79 (1st Cir. 1978)). Whether the prevailing party 
was the defendant or the plaintiff cannot influence the court’s decision whether to award fees under 
the Copyright Act. Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1979, 1985 (2016). In making 
sense of this rule, the Supreme Court has explained that defendants and plaintiffs should be encour-
aged equally to either defend or pursue meritorious defenses and claims. Fogerty v Fantasy, Inc., 510 
U.S. 517, 527 (1994). 
 20 See Fogerty, 510 U.S. at 535 n.19 (adopting the factors a court must consider in determining 
whether to allocate attorney’s fees to the prevailing party under the Copyright Act); Glacier Films 
(USA), Inc. v. Turchin, 896 F.3d 1033, 1037–38 (9th Cir. 2018) (remanding a case because the lower 
court misapplied the Fogerty factors, which the Supreme Court laid out in 1994, when determining 
whether to award attorney’s fees). The Ninth Circuit has provided additional factors that courts should 
consider, such as the degree of success in the litigation and the burden the fee would impose. See 
Perfect 10, Inc. v. Giganews, Inc., 847 F.3d 657, 675 (9th Cir. 2017) (providing other factors a court 
could, but is not required to, consider when deciding whether to award attorney’s fees, such as the 
extent of the prevailing party’s success). For instance, in 2018, in Williams v. Gaye, the U.S. Court of 
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however, is determining when a civil action sufficiently invokes the Copyright 
Act to trigger a court’s fee-shifting abilities in the first place.21 When awarding 
attorney’s fees, a court must be cautious to stay within the Copyright Act’s lim-
ited statutory authority.22 
B. Factual and Procedural Background of Doc’s Dream, LLC 
In 1983, Dr. Eugene Scott, a pastor at both Faith Center and the Wescott 
Christian Center in Glendale, California, launched the first twenty-four-seven 
religious broadcasting network featuring his sermons.23 Dr. Scott reached a 
global audience through his broadcasts, publicly available recordings, and dis-
tribution agreement with Dolores Press.24 The license agreement gave Dolores 
Press the right to distribute Dr. Scott’s works for public viewing.25 When Dr. 
Scott passed in 2005, his widow, Pastor Melissa Scott, took ownership of Dr. 
Scott’s copyrighted works and maintained business relations with Dolores 
                                                                                                                           
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California did 
not abuse its discretion when it denied a party’s request for attorney’s fees based in part on the degree 
of success obtained by that party. 895 F.3d 1106, 1133 (9th Cir. 2018). To determine whether to 
award attorney’s fees, the district court in Williams measured the prevailing party’s success by look-
ing at the extent of infringement. Williams v. Bridgeport Music, Inc., No. LA CV13-06004, 2016 WL 
6822309, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 12, 2016), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Williams v. Gaye, 885 
F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2018). When measuring a prevailing party’s degree of success, courts focus on the 
extent to which the party won or settled on the merits of a case. Universal Dyeing & Printing, Inc. v. 
Lularoe, LLC, No. 17-cv-06096, 2018 WL 4223725 at *7–8 (C.D. Cal. July 23, 2018) (differentiating 
between winning on the merits of a case and winning on a technical defense). 
 21 See Doc’s Dream, LLC v. Dolores Press, Inc., 959 F.3d 357, 360 (9th Cir. 2020) (deciding, as a 
matter of first impression, that declaratory relief for copyright abandonment constitutes a civil action 
under the Copyright Act). 
 22 See 17 U.S.C. § 505 (granting the courts fee-shifting powers under the Copyright Act); Alyeska 
Pipeline Serv. Co., 421 U.S. at 247 (explaining that courts must stay within the explicit powers the 
Copyright Act granted to them). 
 23 See Doc’s Dream, LLC, 959 F.3d at 359. Millions of people watched Dr. Scott’s outlandish and 
notorious commentary every night. See Glenn F. Bunting, The Shock Jock of Televangelism: With 
Savvy Philanthropy and an In-Your-Face Style, Dr. Gene Scott Has Generated a Lavish Lifestyle, 
Powerful Friends in Los Angeles and a Fiercely Loyal Global Following, L.A. TIMES (July 10, 1994), 
https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1994-07-10-tm-14042-story.html [https://perma.cc/B346-
YA7K] (describing Dr. Scott’s “provocative, profanity-laced monologues” and stand-out dialogue that 
included phrases like “Nuke ‘em in the name of Jesus” in regards to the Gulf War).  
 24 Doc’s Dream, LLC, 959 F.3d at 359. 
 25 Id. A distribution license is a “marketing license” for a specific geographic area. License, 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 3. A license agreement is a grant of certain rights from the 
licensor, who holds the copyright, to the licensee. Schuyler Moore, The 9 Types of Film Distribution 
Agreements, FORBES (July 19, 2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/schuylermoore/2019/07/19/types-
of-film-distribution-agreements/?sh=22d322466253 [https://web.archive.org/web/20201119110735/
https://www.forbes.com/sites/schuylermoore/2019/07/19/types-of-film-distribution-agreements/]. 
Rights can include the right to sell the licensor’s work. Id. Dolores Press is “one of the last true Chris-
tian bookstores” and sells Dr. Scott’s recordings and books on its webpage. DOLORES PRESS, INC., 
https://dolorespress.com/ [https://perma.cc/49VB-2W95]. 
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Press.26 In 2014, Minister Patrick Robinson, owner of Doc’s Dream, sought 
permission to upload Dr. Scott’s copyrighted materials online to share with his 
students.27 Dolores Press denied the request, but Robinson published the vide-
os anyway.28 Since then, Dolores Press has filed several lawsuits alleging cop-
yright infringement against Doc’s Dream.29 
In 2015, Doc’s Dream filed a counterclaim seeking declaratory relief that 
Dr. Scott had abandoned his copyrights.30 A successful claim for copyright 
abandonment would eliminate all copyright entitlements of the previous copy-
right holder and, therefore, eliminate Doc’s Dream’s liability for copyright in-
fringement.31 Unconvinced by the copyright abandonment argument, the U.S. 
District Court for the Central District of California granted summary judgment 
in favor of Dolores Press.32 Doc’s Dream appealed, and the Ninth Circuit af-
firmed.33 
As the prevailing party, Dolores Press filed a motion for attorney’s fees 
under § 505 of the Copyright Act.34 In a matter of first impression, the U.S. 
                                                                                                                           
 26 See Doc’s Dream, LLC, 959 F.3d at 359 (providing background on the ongoing business rela-
tionship between Melissa Scott and Dolores Press). A copyright can be transferred by will. See 17 
U.S.C. § 201(d)(1) (providing a copyright holder’s right to bequeath copyrights). Other rights of a 
copyright holder include his or her ability to distribute, sell, transfer ownership, and lease. Id. § 106. 
 27 Doc’s Dream, LLC, 959 F.3d at 359. Doc’s Dream is a limited liability company in Georgia with 
scarce publicity regarding its function. Complaint for Copyright & Trademark Infringement at 2, Dolores 
Press, Inc. v. Robinson, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82214, at *1 (No. 15-cv-02562) (C.D. Cal. June 23, 
2015), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, remanded in part sub nom. Doc’s Dream, LLC v. Dolores Press, 
Inc., 678 F. App’x 541 (9th Cir. 2017). 
 28 Doc’s Dream, LLC, 959 F.3d at 359. Robinson’s justification for moving forward with using 
Dr. Scott’s recordings despite the clear denial of permission was to “stick it to the devil” and “get the 
ball rolling in this legal battle.” Id. 
 29 See id. at 358 (describing how the two parties have alleged a “litany of claims”); see Doc’s 
Dream, LLC v. Dolores Press, Inc., 766 F. App’x 467, 469 (9th Cir. 2019) (examining the several 
claims of copyright infringement of Dr. Scott’s recordings). Defendants in the case include Patrick 
Robinson, Truth Seekers, Inc., Doc’s Dream, LLC, and Bobbi Jones. Doc’s Dream, LLC, 959 F.3d at 
358.  
 30 See Doc’s Dream, LLC, 959 F.3d at 359 (outlining the history and posture of the Doc’s Dream 
saga). Declaratory relief is “a unilateral request to a court to determine the legal status or ownership of 
a thing.” Relief, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 3. 
 31 See Micro Star v. Formgen, Inc., 154 F.3d 1107, 1114 (9th Cir. 1998) (affirming that copy-
rights can be abandoned); Nat’l Comics Publ’g, Inc. v. Fawcett Publ’g, Inc., 191 F.2d 594, 598 (2d 
Cir. 1951) (explaining that when people abandon their copyright, they no longer have rights to that 
copyright). 
 32 Doc’s Dream, LLC, 766 F. App’x at 473. 
 33 Doc’s Dream, LLC, 959 F.3d at 359. 
 34 Id. at 358; see 17 U.S.C. § 505 (providing the attorney’s fees provision of the Copyright Act 
which Dolores Press relied on to file its motion). In the motion, Dolores Press argued that attorney’s 
fees were warranted because Doc’s Dream claim was unreasonable, filed in bad faith, and “worthy of 
deterrence as a meritless claim.” Doc’s Dream, LLC, 959 F.3d at 359. In part, § 505 of the Copyright 
Act seeks to deter parties from bringing frivolous claims by imposing additional monetary conse-
quences on parties that do not take the time to evaluate the merits of their claims. See Oracle Am. v. 
Hewlett Packard Enter. Co., No. 16-cv-01393, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 233432, at *9–10 (C.D. Cal. 
2021] Attorney’s Fees in Declaratory Relief Actions for Copyright Abandonment II.-273 
District Court for the Central District of California denied Dolores Press’s mo-
tion for attorney’s fees, holding that the Copyright Act does not grant courts 
the discretion to award attorney’s fees in an action seeking declaratory relief 
for copyright abandonment.35 Dolores Press appealed, and, in May 2020, the 
Ninth Circuit vacated the district court’s holding for proceedings to determine 
whether to award appropriate attorney’s fees.36 
II. HOW THE COURTS’ ANALYSES OF NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT  
LED TO DIFFERENT HOLDINGS 
In a matter of first impression, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit’s 2020 decision in Doc’s Dream, LLC v. Dolores Press, Inc. affirmed a 
court’s ability to award attorney’s fees under the Copyright Act in declaratory 
relief actions seeking copyright abandonment.37 Section A of this Part discuss-
es the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California’s holding on the 
matter.38 Section B examines the Ninth Circuit’s contrasting opinion.39 
A. The District Court: Construction and Judicial Origin 
In considering whether to grant attorney’s fees to Dolores Press, the dis-
trict court held that a court can award attorney’s fees in declaratory relief ac-
                                                                                                                           
Nov. 12, 2019) (listing reasons that courts should consider deterrence when awarding attorney’s fees 
under the Copyright Act). 
 35 Doc’s Dream, LLC, 959 F.3d at 358–60 (providing an overview of the procedural history of 
Doc’s Dream). The district court focused on two arguments—that copyright abandonment does not 
require construction of the Act and that copyright abandonment’s judicial origins exclude it from 
invoking § 505—to support their conclusion. Id. at 360. 
 36 Doc’s Dream, LLC, 959 F.3d at 363. The Ninth Circuit did not award attorney’s fees itself but 
rather remanded the case to the lower court to determine whether to award Dolores Press attorney’s 
fees. Id.; see Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 535 n.19 (1994) (providing the Fogerty factors). 
An award of attorney’s fees is not automatic, and it is up to the court to decide whether to grant these 
fees. See Lieb v. Topstone Indus., 788 F.2d 151, 156 (3d Cir. 1986) (explaining that attorney’s fees 
are not awarded by default). The Ninth Circuit had jurisdiction to review the district court’s denial of 
attorney’s fees for an abuse of discretion and had the power to review the district court’s legal analysis 
de novo. See Fantasy, Inc. v. Fogerty, 94 F.3d 553, 556 (9th Cir. 1996) (first citing Malijack Prods. v. 
GoodTimes Home Video Corp., 81 F.3d 881, 889 (9th Cir. 1996); and then citing Hall v. Bolger, 768 
F.2d 1148, 1150 (9th Cir. 1985)) (explaining that an appeals court will only review a district court’s 
ruling for an abuse of discretion but that legal analysis and statutory interpretation, which guide the 
court’s holding, can be reviewed de novo); Lieb, 788 F.2d at 154 (stating that an appeals court’s 
standard of review of the district court’s allocation of attorney’s fees is limited to determining if the 
district court abused its power); Advertisers Exch., Inc. v. Anderson, 144 F.2d 907, 909 (8th Cir. 
1944) (explaining that because the trial court did not abuse its discretion, the appeals court must af-
firm the award of attorney’s fees). 
 37 17 U.S.C. § 505; see Doc’s Dream, LLC v. Dolores Press, Inc., 959 F.3d 357, 359 (9th Cir. 
2020) (explaining that the Ninth Circuit has never held that declaratory relief actions for copyright 
abandonment under the Copyright Act allow a party to recover attorney’s fees). 
 38 See infra notes 41–48 and accompanying text. 
 39 See infra notes 49–57 and accompanying text. 
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tions where adjudicating the issue requires construction of the Copyright Act.40 
The court concluded that copyright abandonment claims do not require con-
struction of the Act.41 
Due to the lack of case law on whether a court can grant § 505 attorney’s 
fees in declaratory relief actions for copyright abandonment, the district court 
turned to Nimmer on Copyright, a prevailing copyright treatise, to make the 
determination.42 The district court focused on one of Nimmer’s examples in 
particular, in which two parties disputed royalties over a shared work.43 There, 
Nimmer claimed that the dispute did not arise under the Copyright Act, and, 
thus, a court would not be able to award attorney’s fees.44 As such, the court 
interpreted Nimmer as encouraging courts to award reasonable attorney’s fees 
for declaratory relief actions under § 505 but only if the action requires statuto-
ry construction of the Copyright Act.45 
                                                                                                                           
 40 Doc’s Dream, LLC, 959 F.3d at 358–59. 
 41 See id. at 360 n.1 (explaining the district court’s reasoning as to why a court does not have the 
power to award attorney’s fees in this action). 
 42 Id. at 361; 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 14.10 (Mat-
thew Bender ed., rev. ed. 2019). Nimmer on Copyright is a treatise that is widely regarded as “authorita-
tive” on copyright law. Nimmer on Copyright: A Treatise on the Law of Literary, Musical and Artistic 
Property, YALE L. SCH. LILLIAN GOLDMAN L. LIBR., https://library.law.yale.edu/nimmer-copyright-
treatise-law-literary-musical-and-artistic-property [https://perma.cc/VE4Y-LFHV]. The Supreme 
Court has consistently relied on Nimmer in reaching its holdings. See, e.g., Star Athletica, LLC v. 
Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1002, 1008 (2017) (relying on Nimmer in deciding whether cheerlead-
ing uniforms are copyrightable); Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991) 
(relying on Nimmer in deciding that a party cannot copyright a phone company’s white pages). 
 43 Doc’s Dream, LLC, 959 F.3d at 361; 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 42, § 14.10[B][1][b]. 
According to Nimmer, the classic example of when a party can recover attorney’s fees is when one 
party sues another party for copyright infringement. See 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 42, 
§ 14.10[B][1][a]. Nimmer also provides specific examples of when attorney’s fees would be available 
under actions for declaratory relief. Id. § 14.10[B][1][b]. 
 44 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 42, § 14.10[B][1][b]. 
 45 See Doc’s Dream, LLC, 959 F.3d at 359 (explaining the district court’s reliance on the word 
“construction”); 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 42, § 14.10[B][1][b] (using the word “construc-
tion” in discussing eligibility of attorney’s fees in declaratory relief actions). The district court relied 
on its interpretation of several hypotheticals Nimmer provided, as well as Nimmer’s use of the word 
“construction,” to reach this conclusion. Doc’s Dream, LLC, 959 F.3d at 359. The civil action must fall 
under the Copyright Act in order for a judge to have the power to grant attorney’s fees under the Act. 
See 17 U.S.C. § 505 (specifying its application solely to civil actions under the Act). There is no men-
tion of “construction” in § 505. Id. Instead, the district court relied on Nimmer’s use of the term “con-
struction.” See Doc’s Dream, LLC, 959 F.3d at 359 (claiming that the district court relied on Nim-
mer’s use of construction); 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 42, § 14.10[B][1][b] (using the word 
“construction” various times throughout the examples of when courts can grant attorney’s fees under 
§ 505). Statutory construction involves two steps. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 
837, 842 (1984) (outlining the basic rules of statutory interpretation). First, courts must look to the 
plain language of the statute. Se. Cmty. Coll. v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 405 (1979). If the plain language 
of the statute is ambiguous, the court must then turn to the surrounding context and congressional 
intent to determine the meaning of the statute. See King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 473, 492 (2015) (sum-
marizing and applying the rules of statutory interpretation). 
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After determining that there must be construction of the Act to award at-
torney’s fees, the district court then determined that declaratory relief actions 
for copyright abandonment do not involve construction of the Copyright Act.46 
First, the district court reasoned that because copyright abandonment is a judi-
cially created doctrine, and because Congress decided not to include the doc-
trine in the Copyright Act, copyright abandonment does not fall under the 
Act.47 Second, it held that the elements of a copyright abandonment claim—
intent to abandon the copyright and an outward manifestation of that intent—
do not require construction of the Copyright Act.48 
B. The Ninth Circuit Disagreed and Remanded for a New Trial 
Conversely, the Ninth Circuit, also relying on Nimmer, held that any ac-
tion involving a valid copyright and a dispute over whether the defendant in-
fringed on that copyright invokes § 505 of the Copyright Act.49 After reciting 
the same example from Nimmer the district court relied on, in which attorney’s 
fees were not appropriate following a dispute over royalties, the Ninth Circuit 
evaluated another example as well.50 In this example, a court could grant rea-
sonable attorney’s fees if one party sued another for a declaration that a partic-
ular work “falls outside the scope of copyright protection.”51 The Ninth Circuit 
interpreted the sum of Nimmer’s hypotheticals to illustrate that when there is a 
dispute over the scope of a copyright, it constitutes a civil action under the 
Copyright Act.52 The court concluded that, because determining whether a 
                                                                                                                           
 46 Doc’s Dream, LLC, 959 F.3d at 361. 
 47 Id. at 362. Judge Learned Hand first pioneered the idea of “copyright abandonment” in the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit’s 1951 decision in National Comics Publishing v. Fawcett 
Publishing. 191 F.2d 594, 598 (2d Cir. 1951). The doctrine is widely accepted, and courts frequently 
rely on the Fawcett Publications analysis. Timothy K. Armstrong, Shrinking the Commons: Termina-
tion of Copyright Licenses and Transfers for the Benefit of the Public, 47 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 359, 392 
(2010). The district court relied on the fact that courts created the doctrine prior to the establishment 
of the Copyright Act, thus signifying Congress’s intent not to include the phrase. Doc’s Dream, LLC, 
959 F.3d at 362. The district court also relied on the principles of property law to illustrate that aban-
donment is not exclusive to copyright law and that abandonment in general relies on factors outside of 
the Copyright Act, such as the intent of the alleged abandoner. Id. at 360. 
 48 Doc’s Dream, LLC, 959 F.3d at 362; see Nat’l Comics Publ’g, Inc., 191 F.2d. at 598 (explain-
ing that for a copyright owner to abandon their copyright ownership, they have to have the intent to 
abandon the copyright and make some outward manifestation of their intention to abandon it); see, 
e.g., Hadady Corp. v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 739 F. Supp. 1392, 1398–99 (C.D. Cal. 1990) (il-
lustrating a copyright abandonment case). 
 49 Doc’s Dream, LLC, 959 F.3d at 359. 
 50 Id. at 361. 
 51 Id.; 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 42, § 14.10[B][1][b]. 
 52 See Doc’s Dream, LLC, 959 F.3d at 361 (relying on Nimmer to hold that disputes over copy-
rights invoke § 505); 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 42, § 14.10[B][1][b] (providing various ex-
amples of when a court can grant attorney’s fees). 
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copyright has been abandoned necessarily involves the scope of the copyright, 
it falls under § 505.53 
The Ninth Circuit then addressed the district court’s holding that the Cop-
yright Act explicitly excluded the judicially created copyright abandonment 
doctrine.54 The court reasoned that the origins of copyright abandonment are 
immaterial to determining whether it sufficiently invokes the Act.55 To illus-
trate its reasoning, the court highlighted multiple provisions of the Copyright 
Act that the district court relied on, including copyright attribution, copyright 
transfer, and copyright notice, to highlight how copyright abandonment neces-
sarily involves construction of the Act.56 Finally, the Ninth Circuit concluded 
that it is impossible to discuss a copyright holder’s intention to abandon a cop-
yright, as well as the outward manifestation of that intent, without turning to 
the Copyright Act and, thus, that such actions sufficiently invoke the Act.57 
III. THE NINTH CIRCUIT BETTER CAPTURED CONGRESS’S INTENT 
In 2020, in Doc’s Dream, LLC v. Dolores Press Inc., the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit ruled that courts have the power to award attorney’s 
                                                                                                                           
 53 Doc’s Dream, LLC, 959 F.3d at 361; see 17 U.S.C. § 505 (providing that any civil action under 
the Copyright Act invokes the fee-shifting provision). 
 54 Doc’s Dream, LLC, 959 F.3d at 362; see Nat’l Comics Publ’g, Inc. v. Fawcett Publ’g, 191 F.2d 
594, 598 (2d Cir. 1951) (coining the term “copyright abandonment”). 
 55 Doc’s Dream, LLC, 959 F.3d at 362. 
 56 See id. (listing several of the Copyright Act’s provisions that the district court relied on in com-
ing to its conclusions). Copyright attribution discusses the right of a copyright holder to be accredited 
as the creator of their copyrighted material. 17 U.S.C. § 106A. Transfer of copyright refers to the 
copyright owner’s ability to transfer the ownership to another party. Id. § 204. Copyright notice refers 
to the copyright holder’s right to denote that their work is copyrighted, including adding the tradition-
al “©” symbol. Id. § 401. The Ninth Circuit further acknowledged a third argument that the defendant, 
Doc’s Dream, made to prevent appeal from the district court’s ruling: that the action fell under the 
Declaratory Judgment Act rather than the Copyright Act. Doc’s Dream, LLC, 959 F.3d at 363. Federal 
courts can have jurisdiction for actions under both the Declaratory Judgment Act and the Copyright 
Act. Id. The Declaratory Judgment Act alone, however, does not automatically give a federal court 
jurisdiction. See id. (explaining how the Ninth Circuit would not have had jurisdiction if it only in-
voked the Declaratory Judgment Act). Therefore, the Ninth Circuit responded by emphasizing that if 
the claim only came under the Declaratory Judgment Act, the district court would not have had juris-
diction. Id. The Ninth Circuit concluded that, to satisfy subject matter jurisdiction requirements and 
rule on this case in the first place, the district court must have considered this as a case under the Cop-
yright Act. Id. 
 57 Doc’s Dream, LLC, 959 F.3d at 362; see Nat’l Comics Publ’g, Inc., 191 F.2d at 598 (outlining 
the elements of copyright abandonment). The Ninth Circuit further acknowledged that it would be 
nearly impossible to evaluate a copyright abandonment claim without invoking some analysis of the 
Copyright Act. Doc’s Dream, LLC, 959 F.3d at 362. 
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fees in declaratory relief actions for copyright abandonment.58 The Ninth Cir-
cuit’s holding was correct because it ultimately reflected congressional intent.59 
Given the rarity of fee-shifting provisions and the limited power Congress 
has granted courts under such provisions, courts have a duty to ensure that any 
judicial decision regarding attorney’s fees falls within the strict bounds of its 
statutory allowance.60 Although the Ninth Circuit has put to rest the debate 
over the plain meaning of the § 505 of the Copyright Act, analysis of whether 
its decision upholds Congress’s intent sheds light on whether the court stayed 
within its judicial realm.61 
The Copyright Act aims to advance the constitutional goals of promoting 
science and art by rewarding creators of original works and allowing the public 
to build upon such work.62 As a result, analysis of the Copyright Act must put 
such aims at the forefront.63 Section 505 of the Act promotes these goals in 
two key ways.64 First, it encourages people to advance the arts and sciences by 
affording them additional monetary protections should someone infringe.65 
Second, it promotes the public’s use of the arts and science by protecting them 
from meritless infringement allegations and deterring copyright holders with 
weak claims from going to court.66 
                                                                                                                           
 58 Doc’s Dream, LLC, 959 F.3d at 363. 
 59 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–1401 (providing the Copyright Act and its purposes); Doc’s Dream, LLC 
v. Dolores Press, Inc., 959 F.3d 357, 363 (9th Cir. 2020) (holding that fee-shifting is allowed in de-
claratory relief actions for copyright abandonment). 
 60 See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975) (explaining that 
prevailing parties are not usually entitled to an award of attorney’s fees, that courts must respect this 
rule unless Congress explicitly enables fee-shifting under the circumstances, and that Congress has the 
exclusive power to choose which statutes enable attorney’s fees provisions), superseded, in part, by 
statute, Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Award Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-559, 90 Stat. 2641 (1976) 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b)); Nat’l Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 595 F. Supp. 65, 69 (D.D.C. 1984) 
(explaining that fee-shifting statutes are not the norm but that Congress has clear intent to establish 
outliers to the rule through statutes). 
 61 See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co., 421 U.S. at 247 (explaining the importance of courts staying 
within their granted powers); Doc’s Dream, LLC, 959 F.3d at 363 (ruling on the issue of what falls 
under the Copyright Act’s § 505). 
 62 See Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1979, 1986 (2016) (explaining the goals 
of the Copyright Act). 
 63 See id. (explaining that the purpose of the Copyright Act must be considered when analyzing it). 
 64 See infra notes 65–71 and accompanying text (explaining how § 505 promotes the goals of the 
Copyright Act). 
 65 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 42, § 14.10[A]. 
 66 David E. Shipley, Discouraging Frivolous Copyright Infringement Claims: Fee-Shifting Under 
Rule 11 or 28 U.S.C. § 1927 as an Alternative to Awarding Attorney’s Fees Under Section 505 of the 
Copyright Act, 24 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 33, 34 (2016) (explaining how fee-shifting provisions can deter 
“frivolous claims” as well as reward prevailing parties facing such claims); Robert Aloysius Hyde & 
Lisa M. Sharrock, A Decade Down the Road but Still Running Through the Jungle: A Critical Review 
of Post-Fogerty Fee Awards, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 467, 489 n.1 (2004) (citing Peter Jaszi, 505 and All 
That—The Defendant’s Dilemma, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 107, 107 (1992)) (explaining that 
§ 505 of the Copyright Act is one of the most influential factors in determining whether someone with 
a potential copyright claim will bring forth litigation under the Copyright Act).  
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Awarding attorney’s fees in declaratory relief actions seeking copyright 
abandonment advances the constitutional and congressional goals aforemen-
tioned.67 First, awarding attorney’s fees to the prevailing party of such actions 
both protects creators against infringement and deters infringers with increased 
litigation costs.68 These allowances ensure that copyright infringers cannot rely 
on a frivolous defense of copyright abandonment, as Doc’s Dream did.69 Sec-
ond, awarding attorney’s fees in declaratory relief claims of copyright aban-
donment promotes the public’s use of the arts and science by providing a valid 
defense for the public should a creation truly be abandoned.70 By enabling par-
ties to protect their creations and raise valid claims, while deterring parties 
from bringing fruitless claims in copyright abandonment cases, the overall 
purposes of the Copyright Act—balancing creators’ rights with the public poli-
cy goals of promoting access and use of the arts and sciences—are furthered.71 
                                                                                                                           
 67 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (providing the constitutional goal of protecting the arts and 
sciences); 17 U.S.C. § 505 (maintaining and furthering Congress’s intent in enacting the Copyright 
Act as a whole); supra notes 1–2, 63 and accompany text (explaining the constitutional and congres-
sional goals of the Copyright Act). 
 68 See Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 529 (1994) (citation omitted) (explaining that copy-
right litigation is a serious financial burden and that awarding attorney’s fees may alleviate some pain 
of the process). 
 69 Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Copyright Infringement Markets, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 2277, 2280 
(2013) (explaining the effects of costly litigation, including the costs of attorney’s fees). Some crea-
tors may be discouraged to create because of the extraordinary costs of protecting their works, includ-
ing litigation expenses, and awarding attorney’s fees helps combat these costs. Id. In 2011, the aver-
age cost of infringement litigation for either party typically ranged from $384,000 to $2,000,000, 
making it nearly impossible for small companies or individuals to bring forth infringement claims. Id. 
 70 See Fogerty, 510 U.S. at 527, 535 n.18 (explaining that the purpose of attorney’s fees under 
§ 505 of the Copyright Act is to discourage copyright infringement and that those who have valid 
copyright infringement defenses should also be encouraged to litigate or defend themselves against 
litigation). In 1994, in Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., the Supreme Court analyzed whether a defendant 
should have equal access to § 505 as a plaintiff does. Id. at 527. The Court ultimately determined that 
defendants have just as much of a claim to attorney’s fees under the Copyright Act as plaintiffs. Id. In 
doing so, the Court explained that a valid defense under the Copyright Act could lead to more crea-
tions, thus promoting art and science. Id. 
 71 See 17 U.S.C. § 505 (providing incentives for parties to bring meritorious claims with attor-
ney’s fees and deterring those with frivolous claims by creating extra costs associated with copyright 
litigation); Fogerty, 510 U.S. at 527 (explaining some of the goals of the Copyright Act including the 
promotion of the arts and sciences and protecting creators’ rights). The implications of this case may 
not be widespread, however, as there are still many protections and barriers a prevailing party must 
overcome before a check for attorney’s fees arrives in the mail. See id. at 518 (explaining that a court 
is not required to provide attorney’s fees even when it is allowed to grant them under § 505). First, a 
court still maintains a large amount of discretion in deciding whether to award attorney’s fees. See id. 
(pointing out that § 505’s use of the word “may” confirms that a court is not mandated to award attor-
ney’s fees). An appeals court can only remand a decision regarding whether to reward attorney’s fees 
if there is an abuse of discretion and, even then, the parties will have to go through an appeals process 
where the risk of losing even more money in attorney’s fees may outweigh the benefit of winning the 
extra reward. Lieb v. Topstone Indus.,788 F.2d 151, 154 (3d Cir. 1986). There are still standards the 
courts have set forth, most notably the Fogerty factors, dictating whether a court should award a pre-
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CONCLUSION 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit effectively stayed within 
its judicial realm and upheld Congress’s intentions when it held that attorney’s 
fees are available in an action seeking a declaration of copyright abandonment. 
In so holding, the Ninth Circuit paved the way for the other circuits regarding 
the bounds of § 505. Moving forward, those in the Ninth Circuit and beyond 
must continue to promote the goals of the Copyright Act, as § 505 does, by 
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vailing party attorney’s fees. See Fogerty, 510 U.S. at 535 n.19 (setting forth the various factors a 
court should consider when awarding attorney’s fees under the Copyright Act). 
